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NOTES
WHAT CONSTITUTES TRANSPORTATION OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS

Transportation of intoxicating liquors is a separate criminal
offense under both federal and state prohibition laws. What constitutes transportation is difficult to determine because of the multiplicity of constructions made in cases discussing the question. The

United States Supreme Court has defined transportation as any
carrying from one place to another. 1 This definition is simple and
fairly clear. When such a general proposition is applied to the facts
of a large number of cases, no two of which are alike, confusion is
almost certain to result.
The following cases show typical fact situations which have been
decided by the courts:
1
Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon (1922) 262 U. S. 100, 43 S. Ct. 504, 67 L. Ed.
894, 27 A. L. R. 1306, quoted with approval in State v. McAllister (1923) 187
N. C. 400, 404, 131 S. E. 739, 741.
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In Rush v. Commonwealth,2 the defendant, who had been shot,
appeared at the home of a Mrs. Huddleston and asked her to fix a
bed for him and to call a doctor. She found on the floor at his bedside a pint bottle containing a clear white liquid about two inches
deep. Defendant was sick and vomited, and an odor of liquor was
noticed. The bottle disappeared when Rush went away. His explanation was that he had left home with the bottle to get liquor, but,
not finding any, he put some water in the bottle, and the disagreeable
odor was from California beer which he had drunk before leaving
home. The judgment of guilty was reversed because "carrying
liquor within one's stomach is not transportation within the meaning
of the Prohibition Act."
In Ivey v. State,3 the defendant had spent the day on his farm
with his tenant, digging a ditch. Defendant phoned for a taxi driver
to take him home and the car broke down, whereupon defendant
went to a nearby farmhouse for help. The, taxi driver was found
drunk, officers were called, and on their approach defendant threw
a jar containing whiskey into the ditch by the roadside. Did he
transport it? The trial judge instructed that any transportation,
however slight, is sufficient. The jury found defendant guilty, which
judgment was reversed on appeal, since throwing the jar into the
ditch would not constitute an illegal conveyance "from one place
within this state to another place therein."
'Rush v. Commonwealth (Ky.-1924) 266 S. W. 1046. See also comment
on this case in 13 Ky. L. Jour. 309 (May 1925). This decision is sound but
the reason for it is not clear. It may be based on the fact that the liquor undergoes a chemical change in the stomach, but the real reason seems to be that
the liquor is no longer fit for beverage purposes. See Blakemore on Prohibition, 2nd ed. (1926) p. 212. Of course liquor in a mans' stomach is incapable
of delivery at the end of the transportation.
'he.y v. State (Okla.-1926) 246 Pac. 908. See also Chapman v. State
(Okla. Cr. App.-1924) 230 Pac. 283, where a conviction of illegal transportation was affirmed when the liquor was taken from an automobile into a house
and handed to someone at the back door who went about eighty-five feet
with it. And see De Graff v. State (Okla. Cr.-1909) 103 Pac. 538, where a
conviction was reversed, partly on constitutional grounds, and also because
conveying liquor" from one room in a building to another room in the same
building would not be sufficient. The court agreed with defendant's contention that "the Legislature did not mean to create an offense

moving liquor for a distance, however insignificant. If
commit the offense when we change a .bottle from one
And the court adds that if this were the law "a citizen
every time he takes a drink, for in so doing he removes
bottle or glass to his stomach by way of his mouth."

.

.

. for re-

this is the law we
pocket to another."
commits an offense
the liquor from the

NOTES
In State v. Sigmon,4 the defendant moved for a nonsuit, which
-was not allowed. Thus the question involved is whether the evidence
was sufficient to go to the jury. The most damaging evidence against
defendant was that his car was off the main road with three odorless
empty jugs beside it. A funnel nearby smelled of whiskey and so
did the rear of the car. Defendant was absent when the officers
found the car, but he returned in a few moments and was arrested.
These facts were held to be "more than a scintilla and sufficient to
be submitted to the jury" on the question of the defendant's transportation of liquor. The North Carolina court adopted the accepted
definition of transportation as the act of carrying or conveying from
one place to another. Although the evidence was circumstantial, the
court concluded that the trial court was justified in submitting the
case to the jury because the defendant's cap was on the rear of the
car; empty jugs were beside it; a funnel nearby smelled of whiskey;
there was no whiskey in the car, but the rear of the car smelled of it.
In its opinion the court discussed the danger of intoxicants, quoting
from the Bible and Shakespeare and stating the statutory rule of
construction that the prohibition law should be liberally construed
so as to prevent the use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage.
The desire of the courts generally is to give such effect to the
prohibition law as will tend to break up the illegal liquor traffic. In
Harris v. Commonwealth,5 the Virginia court said that "The prime
object of the Prohibition Act was to break up and prevent the use
of ardent spirits." In this case Harris, the defendant, made wine on
his farm, which was occupied by his daughter, and started back with
it to his home in town, when he was arrested. He relied upon the
proviso in the act which said that it should not be construed "to prevent any person from manufacturing for his domestic consumption
'State v. Siqmon (1925) 190 N. C. 684, 130 S. E. 854; cf. holding evidence
sufficient to go to the jury, State v. Adams (1926) 191 N. C. 526, 132 S. E.
281; State v. Smith (1922) 183 N. C. 725, 110 S. E. 654; State v. McMillan
(1920) 180 N. C. 741, 105 S. E. 403; State v. Killian (1919) 178 N. C. 753,
101 S. E. 109.
Compare with State v. Sigmon, the case of Burke v. State (Okla.-1925)
241 Pac. 829, where the following evidence was held insufficient: Defendant
was arrested in a Ford car but no whiskey found in or at the car. A funnel
-was found in the car and about 150 feet away several pints and near the road
in the weeds an alcoholically malodorous jug, and the surface of the grass
showed signs of "tromping around."
Testimony of witnesses as to odor of whiskey held competent, State v.
Buck (1926) 191 N. C. 528, 132 S. E. 151.

'Harris v. Commonwealth (Va.-1925) 128 S. E. 578.
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at his home . . . wine or cider from fruit of his own raising.
." Does this mean he must manufacture it at home, in which
case defendant would be guilty, or only that he must consume it at
home? The verdict of guilty was affirmed. Note that there are no
punctuation marks within the above-quoted statute. If there had
been a comma after "manufacturing" and one after "home," it would
probably have indicated, in the opinion of the court, that "at his
home" applied to the consumption. But punctuation is a fallible
standard of construction, and lack of it worse, so that the court
resorts to a construction that will make the whole statute "harmonious and consistent," influenced somewhat, apparently, by the fear
that another construction might allow one to "own a vineyard in
Wise county, make an unlimited quantity of wine there, keep it in
his country home, and from time to time transport it to his home in
the city of Richmond." This is too much. If he drinks it all in
Wise county, well and good, but not in Richmond.
It is argued in a number of the cases mentioned above that where
there is possession of intoxicating liquor there must also be transportation. But this is clearly wrong, and the case of Earl v. United
States" holds to the contrary. The act of transportation involves the
defendant's consciousness. Consequently, if the transportation is
7
without his knowledge the defendant cannot be held guilty.
How far must liquor be moved before it will constitute illegal
transportation? In Berry v. State8 the defendant drove up in an
automobile, got a sack with liquor, went 15 or 20 feet, and was
stopped by officers. Defendant was held guilty of transporting
liquor, the court saying that transportation was carrying from place
to place, the distance being immaterial. But in Hamniell v. State,9
a different rule appears. There the owner of a house and lot carried
a quantity of whiskey from a shed on the premises to the attic of
the house, a matter of some 30 feet. It was held that this was not
an unlawful transportation, the decision being based on the view
that transporting from place to place meant from one's own premises
to some distinct area belonging to another. That is, transportation
'Earl v. United States (1925) 4 Fed. (2nd) 532.
"Nettles v. Commonwealth (Va.-1924) 122 S. E. 111. See note on this

case in 11 Va. L. Rev. 79. Also Young v. State (Ga.-1926) 132 S. E. 453,
defendant picked up a friend who had a suit-case containing liquor, but this
was not known to the defendant.
'Berry v. State (Ind.-1925) 148 N. E. 143.
'Hazmmell v. State (Ind.-1926) 152 N. E. 161.

NOTES
involves crossing boundaries of ownership. Consequently, moving
liquor on one's own premises was not unlawful transportation and
is quite a different matter from moving liquor along highways or
over boundary lines. A note in the Virginia Law Review'0 suggested that this is a reasonable rule and would do away with much
confusion.
The mere transfer from one person to another is not transportation,"1 but in the case where the defendant carried the whiskey 20
feet after receiving it, it was held that it was a carrying from one
place to another.' 2 The evidence must show more movement than
is necessary to complete a sale, but if the buyer after taking the
liquor from the hand of the seller actually moves the liquor for only
a few feet there would be a transportation. However, evidence that
the defendant's tracks show that he was walking toward a quart of
liquor is not sufficient on which to base a verdict of guilty. 13 Neither
is it sufficient evidence where a defendant throws away a catsup
14
bottle the contents of which smell like "rotten" corn liquor.
13 Va. L. Rev. 46.
Cunard S. S. v. Mellon (1922) 262 U. S. 100, 43 S. Ct. 504, 67 L. Ed.
894; 33 C. J. 493; cf. Shirley v. State (Okla.-1925) 237 Pac. 627, holding the
distance immaterial.
' State v. Redmond (Mont.-1925) 237 Pac. 486.
Brennan v. State (Okla.-1925) 240 Pac. 1084.
240 Pac. 1100.
1 Youngqblood v. State (Okla.-1925)
In the following cases evidence was held insufficient to warrant a conviction: La Grone v. State (Okla.-1925) 239 Pac. 928. In accord with this view
is State v. Ridge (Mo.-1925) 275 S. W. 59. The court held against defendant's demurrer as to "white mule whiskey" being intoxicating, but was unwilling to allow a conviction to stand on evidence that only raised a strong suspicion of transportation. Accord, Riddle v. State (Tex.-1925) 272 S.W. 165;
Riojas v. State (Tex.-1925) 277 S. W. 640. Note that in all the above cases
the jury would have convicted, if allowed to do so.
In the following cases the evidence held sufficient to warrant a conviction:
Reynolds v. State (Okla.-1925) 234 Pac. 656; O'Quinn v. State (Okla.-1925)
235 Pac. 247; Brooks v. State (Okla.-1925) 235 Pac. 560; Quails v. State
(Okla.-1925) 236 Pac. 446 (defendant ran about 30 feet) ; Castleberry v. State
(Okla.-1925) 236 Pac. 910; Soberberg v. State (Okla.-1925) 237 Pac. 467
Johnson v. State (Tex.-1925) 270 S. W. 167; Murray v. State (Tex.-1925)
270 S. W. 1030; Rodriguez v. State (Tex.-1925) 271 S. W. 380; Smalley v.
State (Tex.-1925) 271 S. W. 909; Jerman v. State (Tex.-1925) 272 S. W.
449; Torres v. State (Tex.-1925) 272 S.W. 460; Odneal v. State (Tex.-1925)
272 S. W. 784; Weaver v. Commonwealth (Ky.-1925) 277 S. W. 1021; Win~tters
v. State (Tex.-1924) 275 S. W. 1015; Davis v: State (Tex.-1925) 275 S. W.
1042; Wood v. State (Tex.-1925) 276 S.W. 286; Anderson v. State (Tex.1925) 276 S.W. 906; Amee v. State (Tex.-1925) 277 S.W. 661, guilty even
though the court did not define "transport," because defendant did not present
request to court before reading of the general charge; Simpson v. State (Ind.1925) 149 N. E. 50; Jameson v. State (Ind.-1925) 149 N. E. 51; Budreau v.
State (Ind.-1925) 149 N. E. 442. But cf. Burnett v. State (Ind.-1925) 149
N. E. 440 (insufficient evidence) ; State v. Habel (S. C.-1926) 132 S.E. 838,
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The method of transportation is immaterial. The carrying may
be for hire or may be gratuitous. The liquor may be carried personally or in a vehicle., The transportation may be by means of
one's "own conveyance or by means of a public carrier.16 An intention of delivering the liquor to another person is not essential to
transportation. But there must be a real carrying from one place
to another, and the courts construe the prohibition law liberally so
as to prevent the use of intoxicants. The actual movement from one
place to another is the important thing, although the decisions which
have been discussed indicate a great confusion in the decided cases.
P. H. WINSTON.
ADMINISTRATIVE

LAw--POWER

OF STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION

What is the legal status of the State Highway Commission?
Two cases of wide prominence recently decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court present the question squarely.
The first of these is the case of the Town of Newton v. State
Highway Commission.' Two routes were surveyed for the location
of a state highway from Statesville, county seat of Iredell County,
to Newton, county seat of Catawba County. The southern route,
which has been maintained as a link in route No. 10 of the state
highway system, enters Newton in the southeastern portion and
passes by the court house and along the principal street through the
center of the town, and thence to Hickory over the present hardsurfaced road funning from Newton to Hickory. The northern
route, which the commission proposed to build and adopt as a link
in route No. 10 in place of the present southern route, would enter
Newton just inside the corporate limits on the northern side, about
1s miles from the court house; would be shorter than the southern
route; and would be less expensive, but would necessitate the erection of an expensive bridge over the Catawba River. Plaintiff
brought action to restrain defendant from building the northern
route.
pouring liquor from car; State v. La Due (Minn.-1925) 205 N. W. 450; Curtion v. State (Okla.-1925) 240 Pac. 142; Murray v. State (Okla.-1925) 240
Pac. 146; Fisher et al v. State (Okla.-1925)

(Okla.-1925) 240 Pac.
' Cunard S. S. Co.
894. 27 A. L. R. 1306,
N. )C.400, 404, 131 S.

240 Pac. 655; Glass v. State

752; Hicks v. State (Okla.-1925) 240 Pac. 1088.
v. Mellon (1922) 262 U. S. 100, 43 S. Ct. 504, 67 L. Ed.
quoted with approval in State v. McAllister (1923) 187
E. 739, 741; Commonwealth v. Dzewizcin (Mass.-1925)

147 N. E. 582, transportation by airplane.

Town of Newton v. State Highway Commission (1926) 192 N. C. 54, 133

S. E. 522.

NOTES
The section of the statute 2 under which the action was brought
provides that the state highway system should connect all county
seats, all principal towns, state parks, and principal state institutions;
that the roads should be laid out according to the routes shown on a
map adopted by the Legislature as a part of the statute; that "the
roads so shown can be changed, altered, added to or discontinued by
the State Highway Commission [created by the same act]: Provided, no roads shall be changed, altered or discontinued so as to
disconnect county seats, principal towns, state or national parks or
forest reserves, principal state institutions, and highway systems of
other states."
The trial judge rendered his decision for the plaintiffs, and the
defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court refused to apply the principal, "That courts
may not interfere with discretionary powers conferred upon administrative boards for the public welfare unless their action is so
clearly unreasonable as to amount to an oppressive and manifest
abuse of discretion," 3 saying through Justice Brogden, that the
statute in express language refuses to allow the exercise of discretion by the commission as to county seats, and further, that the proposed route, running to a point just inside the corporate limits of the
county seat and not through the town as formerly, did not connect
the town with the state highway system, as required by the Road
Act with its attached map; therefore, the Commission was without
authority to adopt such a route.
Chief Justice Stacy, with whom Justice Adams concurred, dissented from the majority view. He reasoned that the Commission
is an agency of the State, created by the Legislature under authority
granted by the Constitution; that the act creating the Commission
restricted its power in locating roads only in so far as to prohibit
the disconnecting of county seats, etc.; that the courts cannot control
the exercise of that power except when it is abused; and that
physical connection of a highway with the paved street system of a
county seat is such substantial compliance with the statute and the
map made a part thereof that plaintiff failed to make out a case
calling for judicial interference. Justice Stacy asks, "How can it
be said, as a matter of law, that the two county seats will be discon'Pub. Lavs 1921, ch. 2, s. 7; Vol. III, C. S. 3846 (c).
'Brodnax v. Groom (1870) 64 N. C. 244.
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nected by the proposed change, when in fact they will still be connected by the highway . . . by making physical contact with
the street systems of the two places ?"
The second case is that of Carlyle v. State Highway Corninission.4 The facts are as follows: Route No. 20 leads westward
from Laurinburg through Pates and Pembroke and by McNeill's
Bridge into Lumberton, and is paved. Route No. 70 leads northwestward from Raeford, the county seat of Hoke County, through
Red Springs, by Philadelphus Church, and by McNeill's Bridge,
where it connects with and follows route No. 20 into Lumberton.
A third route lies several miles north of No. 70, and leads from Red
Springs to Lumberton. The Commission adopted, some five years
ago, route No. 70 as a link in the State system of highways, complying with the statutory provisions 5 therefor by posting at the court
house door in Lumberton a map showing route No. 70 as that
selected by the Commission between Raeford and Lumberton, and
by notifying the proper county officials of such selection; no objection was made during the sixty days following the posting of the
map, this being the time allowed by law for the filing of objections.
The Commission decided to-pave route No. 70 from Red Springs
to Lumberton (the section from Raeford to Red Springs being
already paved) ; but it proposed to run the road from Red Springs
to Philadelphus Church, and then to bend obliquely to the right
(south) and run the road down to Pates, near Pembroke, and thence
along route No. 20 by McNeill's Bridge into Lumberton, thus abandoning that portion of the present route No. 70 which lies between
Philadelphus Church and McNeill's Bridge. The distance from
Philadelphus Church to Lumberton by the proposed route is three
miles longer than the distance over the present route, but the cost of
construction will be approximately $225,000 less, by reason of the
connection made by the proposed route with route No. 20 at Pates,
near Pembroke, the road from Pates to Lumberton being already
paved.
Plaintiff sought an injunction restraining defendant from constructing the proposed route, and an order for the paving of the
present route No. 70 from Red Springs to Lumberton.
'Carlyle v. State Highway Commission (1927) 193 N. C. 36.

'Note 2, supra.

NOTES
Certain persons who were allowed to intervene in the suit also
sought an injunction restraining defendant from constructing the
proposed route, and an order for the construction of the road from
Red Springs to Lumberton along the route which lies several miles
to the north of the present route No. 70; this petition was based
upon the contention that, according to the legislative map, this route
was the one to be followed.
Defendant admitted that the proposed route is not in accord with
the legislative map.
The trial judge ruled that the Commission was without power to
abandon a portion of route No. 70 and build a road along the proposed route, and granted the restraining order. Defendant appealed.
Justice Brogden, writing for the majority of the court, said that
"the statute means that when an existing highway has been designated, mapped, selected, established and accepted by the State Highway Commission as the sole and independent connection between two
county seats in compliance with the formalities prescribed by the
statute that this is a location of the road as a permanent link of the
State System of Highways. . . . We are of opinion that any
radical or substantial departure therefrom would constitute a disconnection." The opinion then proceeds to a discussion of the three
reasons urged by defendant for not upholding the decision of the
trial court. (1) The proposed road, by terminating at Pates, near
Pembroke, thirteen miles from Lumberton, would not "run to" and
"connect" the two county seats, Raeford and Lumberton. (2) The
7
Moore's Crossing case 6 was held not to apply; the Cameron case
presented no propositions decisive of the Lumberton case; the Newton case8 held "that the defendant was without power to make
radical changes and departures from the connection so established."
(3) The principle laid down in Brodnax v. Groom9 was not applicable, as the legislature left no discretion to the State Highway Commission after the Commission had adopted a road, but expressly
made that selected route a part of the state system; the statute was
mandatory in its terms.
'Road Commissioners v. Highway Commission (1923) 185 N. C. 56, 115
S. E. 886.
'Cameron v. Highway Commission (1924) 188 N. C. 84, 123 S. E. 465,
discussed in 3 N. C. L. Rev. 77.

'Note 1, supra.
' Note 3, supra.
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Justice Clarkson wrote a concurring opinion because "it may not
be amiss to call attention to a few errors that the Chief Justice [with
Justice Adams] has fallen into in his dissenting opinion. . .
How many times did the statute contemplate that the defendant
could exercise its discretion (in locating a road)? It claims the
right to exercise it in the same matter twice. If twice, why not a
dozen times? . . . Is there any reason why the Legislature
could not locate a road by legislative decree? . . . The Court
holds that it has the right to determine when a highway runs to a
county seat, and also to determine whether a county seat has been
disconnected. . . . If route No. 70 does not terminate at Pates,
where it intersects route No. 20, what becomes of it? Not another
inch of grading or excavation can be done upon it. Not an inch
of paving could be laid upon it beyond that point. It becomes a lost
road. Does it take to the air at Pates or is it in the contemplation
of the mind deemed to continue an intangible ghostlike existence
with No. 20? Aside from fine metaphysical distinctions, I think
the road as a practical proposition terminates at Pates."
In the leading dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Stacy makes the
following points: (1) Quoting from the opinion of Justice Adams
in the Cameron case, the Commission "was vested with the specific
right 'to change or relocate any existing roads that it may now own
or may acquire,'" subject to the limitations of the proviso. (2)
"The fundamental error in this case lies in the fact that the court is
undertaking to deal with a matter which properly belongs to another
tribunal. The location of the road in question has been determined
by the State Highway Commission in the exercise of authority conferred upon it by statute. There is no suggestion of any arbitrary
action or abuse of discretion on its part. We are, therefore, concerned solely with the lawfulness of the proposed change, and nothing else." (3) Cites many other examples of more than one route
marked along the same road, including the three mile stretch from
McNeill's Bridge to Lumberton, over which both No. 20 and No. 70
now run. (4) "The case, in its final analysis, presents but a single
question. It is this: Has the location of all the highways, going to
make up the State System, been settled in advance by legislative
fiat, or is this a matter to be determined by the Sfate Highway Commission? . . . I think the Legislature has wisely committed this
question to the decision of the State Highway Commission in the
exercise of a sound but not arbitrary judgment." (5) "Enough has
already been said to demonstrate the necessity of further legislative

NOTES
action in order that the State Highway Commission may proceed,
in some workable way, with the construction of the state highways."
Justice Adams, also dissenting, makes three points: (1) That a
deflection of the road so as to have it connect with No. 20 at Pembroke instead of McNeill's Bridge is not a disconnection of the two
county seats involved. (2) That the Commission should not be
held unalterably to a decision once made, for stated reasons, chiefly
those raised by necessity. (3) That the exercise of discretion by the
Commission is restricted by the opinion "to such a narrow compass
as to make it exercise for practical purposes well-nigh a nullity.
. . .The Court up to this time has never made a decision which
limits discretionary power of any similar administrative and governmental agency as the present decision limits the discretionary power
of the defendant."
The words of the statute limit the power of the State Highway
Commission only in one respect, viz., that county seats, etc., may
not be "disconnected." The construction of that word as used in the
statute is a matter of law, to be decided by the courts. Brogden, J.,
says, "The whole proposition, therefore, resolves itself, in the final
analysis, to a determination of the question of whether or not the
proposed road . . . is in effect disconnecting the county seat."10
And the decision in both cases given above is that the county seats
are disconnected.
In the Newton case, it was said: "We hold that the spirit of the
Road Act contemplated that all county seats should be served by the
highway system substantially as designated on the map, and that the
road, as proposed by the defendant, is not a substantial compliance
with the true intent and meaning of the road law." In the Lumberton case, it was said: "We hold, upon the facts as disclosed by this
record: 1. That the defendant is without power to divert No. 70
and terminate it at Pates, 13 miles from Lumberton, because it has
been mapped, established, accepted and incorporated as it exists as a
permanent link or part of the State Highway System. 2. That the
road, as proposed, does not run to and connect Lumberton as contemplated by the statute, and this requirement was mandatory, and
therefore excluded any exercise of discretion in that particular."
As to this matter of substantial compliance and discretionary
power, in a Nebraska case 1" the court said: "In Howard v. County
"Newton v. Highway Connnis.rion (1926) 192 N. C. 54, 60, 133 S. E. 522,
526.
' Throener v. Board of Superz4sors (1908) 82 Neb. 453, 118 N. W. 92.
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Board of Supervisors, 54 Neb. 443, 74 N. W. 953, it was held: 'The
propriety or necessity of opening and working a section line road is
committed to the sound discretion of the county board, and its
decision is not subject to review.' In Otto v. Conroy, 76 Neb. 517,
107 N.W. 752, it was held that the action of the county board in
their decision of the expediency of establishing a public road was
not subject to judicial review. Although both cases cited apply the
rule to public roads established upon section lines, the rule is equally
applicable to any proposed road, and the courts have no more right
to interfere by injunction than by an appeal from the decision of the
county board."
In a South Carolina case, 1 2 the facts were these: The road act
required road No. 4 to terminate in the city of Anderson. The
route selected by the road supervisor connected with road No. 5
about a mile from Anderson. The court said: "There is no more
reason to say that road No. 4 terminates at road No. 5 than to say
that road No. 5 terminates at road No. 4.

.

.

. This short piece

[of one mile along road No. 5 into Anderson] was to be used jointly
by both roads and was as much a part of one road as the other.
In order for a road to be considered a public highway, it
must extend from one public place to another public place, and permit public use all the way. As soon as there is an obstruction, then
communication is cut off, and the public character of its use is
destroyed. There is nothing to even delay a traveler in going from
Williamston to Anderson when he reaches the junction of the two
roads." And in the cases under discussion, there is nothing to
hinder a traveler in going to Newton when he reaches the corporate
limits of the town, or in going to Lumberton when he reaches Pates.
In an Alabama case,' 8 the court said: "Obviously, the statute
commits the location of the highways to be constructed and maintained by it to the discretion of the commission. The location of
such highways is not a function of the courts. In that matter the
commission

.

.

.

exercises an administrative -nd quasi legis-

lative function which when free from fraud or corruption, cannot
be reviewed by the courts."
In an Ohio case, 14 the location of a road was held valid, although
a special statute authorizing the road was only substantially followed.
"Prui;t s. Kinj (1920) 114 S. C. 525; 104 S. E. 191.
"Bouchelle v. State Highway Commission (1924) 211 Ala. 474, 100 So. 884.
' State v. Hamilton, 8 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 457.

NOTES
By a provision 15 of the road act passed in 1923, the decisions
and determinations of the Highway Commission may be reviewed by
the courts according to the same procedure under which the decisions
and determinations of the corporation commission are reviewed.16
The topic of "Judicial Review of the North Carolina Corporation
Commission" has been discussed in an exhaustive and able article in
the NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW, 1 7 in which two instances are
given when the courts will set aside the orders of an administrative
commission: "(a) Where the order was beyond its constitutional
powers. This includes the proposition whether the commission could
constitutionally exercise the power; likewise, whether the order was
within its statutory powers. (b) Where the order was unreasonable.
This includes the question whether the order was so unreasonable or
arbitrary as to amount to an invasion of the constitutional rights of
the complaining party; likewise, whether there was sufficient evidence to support the order."' 8
In the exercise of powers, the corporation commission and the
highway commission are in practically the same situation: the former
fixes rates; the latter locates roads.
As the Road Act has been held constitutional, it must be conceded
that the highway commission may constitutionally exercise the right
of locating roads. As to whether the location of the proposed roads
was within the statutory powers of the commission, is another question, and is, it seems, the question over which the North Carolina
Supreme Court split. The majority opinions hold to the proposition
that the Highway Commission had no statutory authority to locate
the proposed roads except in strict accord with the routes as laid out
on the legislative map, with slight deviations permitted in the interests of the regulation of traffic or other controlling problems of engineering. The minority opinions clearly demonstrate the position that
the Commission had the expressly granted authority, to be used
reasonably in the exercise of a sound discretion, and subject only to
review in case of arbitrary or corrupt abuse of power.
It appears, from the definitely settled attitude of the courts in
regard to the corporation commission, and from the dearly parallel
powers of that commission to the powers of the Highway Coin'Vol. III, C. S. 3846 (p).
11C. S. 1090-1104.

' Nichols: "Judicial Review of the North Carolina Corporation Commission," 2 N. C. L. Rev. 69.

2 N. C. L. Rev. 69, 76.
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mission, that the minority opinions present the better view, the prevailing view, and the view of the weight of authority both generally
and in North Carolina. The Highway Commission is an expert
body of capable men; it has at its finger tips the greatest facilities
for making decisions which will conform not only to the public
needs, but substantially enough to the legislative directions. "In
determining the question of public necessity, utility, and convenience,
the officers or tribunal having the matter in hand may properly consider the topography of the country, and the wants and wishes of
the people; the condition of the population, the location of public
places, the location of railroads, and location of highways already
established or proposed . . . the extent of travel, and the ex19 Is it within the usual realm of law making bodies
pense. .
to consider that by the simple expedient of drawing lines on a map
they can decide with any degree of expertness such necessary and
inevitable propositions as those mentioned above-things which are
an integral part of every scientifically constructed highway intended
to serve the greatest number of the taxpayers with the greatest
convenience?
"The powers and duties committed to the jurisdiction of the commission are exclusive and cannot be exercised or accomplished by
the courts of the state.20 But, acting upon their own independent
judgment, the courts can and will set aside the commission's order
when such order is beyond its constitutional powers or when it is
unreasonable."'21 Although this statement was made with reference
to the corporation commission, it applies with equal force to the
highway commission. The minority opinions admit the power of the
State Highway Commission, and can wring no unreasonableness
from the acts of that body. But as to the majority opinions, the
question arises: Is the State Highway Commission an expert body
of ten men, with whom is placed that discretionary power usually
conferred upon expert bodies for the expedition and dispatch of
detailed affairs, or is it composed of a body of subordinates subject
to superintendence by courts, who are not experts in highway construction ?
It is quite worthy of note that one of the recent bills introduced
in the present Legislature is aimed at a clarification of the law as it
is now interpreted by the Supreme Court. This bill would place
" 37 Cyc. 49, s. (C).
"Service Co. v. Power Co. (1919) 179 N. C. 330, 334, 102 S. E. 625.
' 2 N. C. L. Rev. 69, 77.

NOTES
North Carolina back in line with its own former decisions, and with
the decisions of the courts of the nation generally, by allowing to
the Highway Commission as an administrative body that discretion
which should rightly -be theirs-not only as a legal matter but by
reason of their splendid accomplishments in building the North
Carolina road system.
HILL YARBOROUGH.
JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENT CORPORATIONS

What is the present tendency of the courts in regard to assuming
jurisdiction over non-resident corporations? A recent opinion of
the North Carolina Supreme Court brings us face to face with this
question in the case of Ivy River Land and Timber Co., et. al., v.
National Fire and Marine Insurance Company of Elizabeth, N. J.
This was an action on an insurance policy to recover damages for
fire loss. By application through a New York broker, a policy of
fire insurance on property situated in North Carolina was issued to
the plaintiffs, being executed and delivered in New Jersey, by an
insurance company incorporated under the laws of New Jersey. The
first premium on the policy was paid in New Jersey, and shortly
thereafter the plaintiffs' property was destroyed by'fire. No adjuster for the insurance company was sent to North Carolina; no
agent had been appointed upon whom process could be served; and
the insurance company had never been admitted nor licensed to do
business in North Carolina as required by statute. The insurance
company had theretofore issued two other policies in North Carolina, one being still in effect, although nothing appears concerning
the methods of issuing these policies. Service was made-in the case
at bar-on the Secretary of State, according to a statute providing
for such service on non-resident corporations doing business in the
state. He mailed a copy to the insurance company in New Jersey.
The insurance company appeared specially and moved to strike out
the return of service and dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court having found as a fact that the insurance company was not doing business in North Carolina ruled accordingly,
and on appeal this was affirmed.
No further facts appearing, the case is obviously in accord with
the overwhelming weight of authority: that a state court acquires
no jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation which has neither
'Timber Co. v. Insurance Co. (1926) 192 N. C. 57, 133 S. E. 424.
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(1) consented to service of process, 2 (2) nor been present within
the state, 8 (3) nor carried on business in the state. 4 Under the facts
as found, the insurance company had specially appeared and denied
consenting to any service, and there certainly are no words to show
that it did consent; the insurance company had never been present
within the state, being domiciled in New Jersey and having no agent
nor place of business of any sort in North Carolina; and, finally,
the insurance company had never performed a single act of business
in this state, for we must presume that the other two policies issued
to citizens in North Carolina were issued under circumstances
similar to those in the instant case.
However, it is suggested that, had further facts, quite possible
under the circumstances, appeared, the decision might well have been
different. Let us suppose that the two other policies issued by this.
insurance company to citizens of North Carolina had been issued
so as to become enforceable upon the performance of a condition by
the insured in the state of North Carolina, such as mailing a cheque
in payment of the first premium or what not. In such circumstances, these two insurance contracts would have been made in
North Carolina, for delivery of an insurance policy is the last act
necessary to make the policy effectual. 5
Conceding that the insurance company (defendant) had issued
the other two policies to take effect in North Carolina, it would have
performed two business transactions within the state.0 Would this
have been enough to give the courts of North Carolina jurisdiction?
C. S. 1137 gives jurisdiction to North Carolina over a foreign corporation "doing business" therein, provided service be made upon
the Secretary of State, who is bound to mail a copy to an officer of
the corporation. Such statutes have been held to be constitutional
under the "Due Process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7
And here we are forced to consider two questions: what is "doing
business"; how are such statutes reconcilable with the "Due Process"
clause ?
$Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French (1855) 18 How. 404.

'Moulin v. Ins. Co. (1855) 25 N. J. L. 57.

'-askell v. Aluminum Co. of America (1926) 14 F. (2nd) 864.

"Dawson v. Ins. Co. (1926) 192 N. C. 313, 135 S. E. 34; Williston on
Contracts, sec. 97.
6lndemnity Co. v. Jarman (1902) 187 U. S. 197, 204, by Brown, J.: "A
man does business when he contracts obligations-he ceases to do business when
he discharges them." Baring v. Comm'rs. (1898) 1 Q. B. D. 78.
1 R. R. Co. v. Cobb (1925) 190 N. C. 375, 129 S. E. 828; Lumberman's Ins.
Co. v. Meyer (1905) 197 U. S. 407.

NOTES
The term "doing business" has been variously defined by the
courts of the different states. The general trend of the decisions and
the method of legal reasoning may be seen from the case of Haskell
v. Aluminum Co. of America.8 There a non-resident corporation
had a sales office in the state where the action was brought and also
a sales-manager who had only power to solicit orders to be approved
at the home office of the defendant insurance company, but did have
the general power of making and performing contracts for the maintenance of the office, viz., for lights, water, etc. The federal district
court held that this constituted sufficient "doing business" by the
insurance company to subject it to the jurisdiction of the court,
saying, ".

.

.

the activities carried on by the defendant through

its New England district sales office constituted the carrying on of
business in Massachusetts to such an extent, and were of such a
nature, that it must be held that the defendant was 'found' within
the district of Massachusetts, within the meaning of that word as
used in the Clayton Act."9 And where an agent is sent into the state
for the corporation to adjust claims, that is held to be "doing busi10
ness" therein so as to subject the corporation to the state courts.
Now, how do the courts reconcile such decisions upon state
statutes giving the state courts jurisdiction over foreign corporations
during business in these states? In answering this question jurists
differ, though all agree that such statutes are constitutional. There
are two theories upon which such extraterritorial jurisdiction is
based: (1) Consent by the corporation to service and (2) Presence
of the corporation within the state.
The Consent Theory is advocated by Professor Beale who says,
the act of doing business in acceptance of a conditional
offer is equally an act of consent to the terms of the offer thus
accepted."" The cold logic of this theory grows colder, however,
when it is realized that this theory requires no actual consent but
only a statute laying down some condition for "doing business" in
the state, such as the appointment of a statutory agent for service of
process. He may be appointed by statute but need not be duty-bound
"Haskell v. Aluminum Co. of America (1926) 14 F. (2nd) 864.
'Cornp. St. 8835k, that an action could be brought against a corporation not
only in the judicial district where it is an inhabitant, but in any judicial district
where it may be found or transacts business.

"Insurance Co. v. Meyer (1904) 197 U. S. 407.
Beale on Foreign Corporations, par. 266.
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to notify the defendant, inasmuch as the defendant has consented
to service on any agent as provided by statute. But such process the
courts hold unconstitutional, as this statutory method is not reasonably calculated to give notice to defendant corporation.' 2 Professor
Beale further says, "Since consent is given by acts, not by mere
thoughts or words, this implied consent ('doing business' in state
when a statute regulates the condition) is as real as consent expressed by spoken or written words."' 3 But even this cannot be
true, for "if a corporation does business, all the while protesting that
it does not authorize anyone to accept process on its behalf, there is
no consent in the external sense. The ensemble of acts and words
conveys a clear impression of non-consent."' 14 It is merely an
attempt to conceal the fiction of consent and seems unsatisfactory,
for "the constitution is not to be satisfied with a fiction."' 5
The Presence Theory of jurisdiction over foreign corporations
is enunciated in Moulin v. Trenton, etc., Ins. Co.,16 where the court
held that a corporation which establishes an office in the state is
actually present within the jurisdiction, the court saying: "It has,
then, existence, vitality, efficiency, beyond the jurisdiction of the
sovereignty which created it, provided it be voluntarily exercised."
But just the opposite rule was laid down by Taney, C. J., in Bank of
Augusta v. Earle;17 he said: ". . . and this corporation can have
no legal existence out of the bounds of the sovereignty by which it
is created. It exists only in the contemplation of the law, and by
force of the law, and where that law ceases to operate the corporation can have no existence. It must dwell in the place of its
creation." And the United States Supreme Court upheld this doctrine in 1891,18 later refusing to repudiate it, but choosing to place
jurisdiciton on the Consent Theory in Barrow Steamship Co. v.
Kane.'9 But Judge Learned Hand, in Smolik v. Philadelphia &
Reading Coal Co.,20 doing away with the theories of constructive
presence and consent, frankly states the reason for jurisdiction:
"Reserve Asso. v. Phelps (1902) 190 U. S. 147; Church v. Church Asso.
(Calif.-1910) 107 Pac. 633.
"Note 11, supra.
"'Henderson, Position of Foreign Corporationsin American Constitutional
Law, p. 95.
"Holmes, J., in Hyde v. U. S. (1912) 225 U. S. 347, 390.
"'Moulin v. Ins. Co. (1855) 25 N. J. L. 57.
"Bank of Augusta v. Earle (1839) 13 Peters 519.
'Shaw v. Mining Co. (1891) 145 U. S. 444.
"Steamship Co. v. Kane (1898) 170 U. S. 100.
OSmolik v. Coal & Iron Co. (1915) 222 Fed. 148.

NOTES
"The court in the interest of justice imputes results to the voluntary
act of doing business within the foreign state quite independently of
any intent (to consent). The limits of that intent are as independent
of any actual intent as the consent itself."
This statement by Judge Hand and the decisions of many of the
courts seem to discard both these fictitious theories of jurisdiction.
They proceed to give the courts of a state jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation on "doing business" statutes, if service, as required, is
reasonably bound to give notice; and, further, if the corporation is
performing such acts of its business in the state so as to have a
material effect upon its citizens. The Court says, in Haskell v.
Aluminum Co., supra,2 1 to reiterate: "My conclusion, therefore, is
that the activities carried on by the defendant through its New
England district sales office constituted the carrying on of business
in Massachusetts to such an extent, and were of such a nature,
that it must be held that defendant was 'found' within the district of
Massachusetts." This idea of a corporation's being "found" within
a foreign state would be contrary to Chief Justice Taney's single
locality doctrine to which the courts of the United States are wedded.
It is, therefore, improbable that the Court meant to say more than
that the acts of the corporations in the state have such a material
effect upon citizens that the state's laws should govern its activities
therein. The Indiana court has held that writing insurance on
property of residents in the state is doing business therein so as to
render the corporation subject to process, though not licensed and
having no office there.22 Another court has held that "although the
record in each case disclosed but one transaction of the corporation,
that transaction was not merely incidental or casual. It was a part
of the very business to perfdrm which the corporation existed. It
did distinctly indicate a purpose on the part of the corporation to
engage in business within the state and to make Kansas a part of its
field of operation." 23 Here the court is obviously exercising jurisdiction over a foreign corporation upon the theory submitted, supra,
to allow the citizens protection of the state laws to prevent imposition
of fraud or injustice.
The Minnesota Court has even gone so far as to say: "The Supreme Court of the United States has not decided that a foreign
insurance company is not amenable to process of the courts in an
'Haskell v. Aluninunm Co. (1926) 14 F. (2nd) 864.
"McCord v. Insurance Co. (Ind.-1911) 94 N. E. 1053, 1054.
' Mason, J., in Plow Co. v. Wyland (Kans.-1904) 76 Pac. 863.
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action brought upon insurance pQlicies issued to citizens of that state
covering property situate in that state, or that such a company is
not doing business in the state to such an extent which subjects it
to service of such process, when it appears that it had issued other
policies covering other property within the state. We, therefore,
hold that the appellant failed to establish immunity from service
made in these cases by merely showing that the contract of insurance
was not executed in this state and that they (the corporation) had
no office nor agent nor place of business in Minnesota, and had not
appointed the Insurance Commissioner as their attorney-in-fact to
receive service of process."

24

It is, however, said in Bank of Amer-

25

ica v. Whitney Bank: "The jurisdiction taken of foreign corporations, in the absence of statutory requirements or express consent,
does not rest upon a fiction of constructive presence, like 'qui facit
per alium facit per se.' It flows from the fact that the corporation
itself does business in the state or district in such a manner and to
such an extent that its actual presence there is established." Yet
this decision taken literally would be contra to the single-presence
theory of Taney, C. J., which the court has regularly followed.
Could the court here mean only to say that the effect of the
foreign corporation's act in the state upon the citizens is the same
as though the corporation were actually present, so far as service of
process and jurisdiction be concerned?
It is submitted, then: if the facts in the instant case had shown
that the other two policies were so issued as to indicate an intent to
carry on operations in North Carolina 26-and these three policies
were all issued to citizens of this state on property therein within
the space of a year and a half-then the opinion of the court might
have been different on the theory that the corporation by its acts of
business in this state27 was affecting and intending further to affect
citizens to such an extent as to be "found" in North Carolina for the
28
purposes of jurisdiction.
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Massey S. S. Co. v. Insurance Co. (Minn.-1922) 189 N. W. 714, 717.
'Bank of America v. Whitney Bank (1922) 261 U. S. 171.
Colliers Co. v. McKeever (1905) 183 N. Y. 98.
' Hoffstater v. Jewell (Idaho-1921) 196 Pac. 194; Beard v. Pub. Co. (1881)
71 Ala. 60.
' Holmes, J., in Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Conn. (1926) 47 Sup. Ct. 88: "It
is true that the obligation arose from a contract made under the law of another
state, but the act was done in Ohio, and the capacity to do it came from the
law of Ohio, so that the co~peration of that law was necessary to the obligation imposed."

